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Abstract
This paper studies how advertising inﬂuences ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D. The link
between advertising and industry innovation is important, not only because advertising can spur
R&D by spreading product knowledge, but also because advertising can discourage new innovative
ﬁrms from entering the industry.
This paper ﬁnds that a worse advertising technology can result in local improvements in
industry innovation rates. Globally, however, a complete ban on advertising always reduce industry
growth. This result is signiﬁcant because industry advertising spending is quantitatively signiﬁcant
and there are potential connections between public policy towards advertising and R&D.
This paper presents a variant of the Grossman and Helpman (1991) quality ladder model.
The key diﬀerence is that the model in this paper allows advertising to gradually spread product
awareness among consumers. This model diﬀers from the entry deterrence literature by assuming
perfect price discrimination. Technically, this assumption allows a fully tractable model and
analytical characterization of a stationary equilibrium in a dynamic setting, which is not previously
available. In terms of economic analysis, this assumption eliminates the extra proﬁt incentives for
new ﬁrms to enter early, and makes incumbent ﬁrms more inclined to use advertising as a deterrent.
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Economic growth is widely recognized as being driven in large part by innovation (i.e. by
research and development). Consequently, the abundant theoretical literature on industry
growth (e.g. Grossman and Helpman (1991))1 focuses on ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in R&D. One
factor that may speciﬁcally inﬂuence R&D, which has largely been ignored by the literature,
is advertising. Advertising allows ﬁrms to make consumers aware that it has developed an
innovation over the existing state-of-the-art product. Therefore, improvements in advertising
spur R&D.
There is another force in industries in which strategic interaction plays an important role.
If current state-of-the-art products are heavily advertised, they may discourage innovations by
new entrants, as they will face intense competition from well-entrenched incumbents. In fact,
there is ample literature dating back to Bain (1949), arguing that advertising can deter entry
by new ﬁrms. Then in industries where strategic interaction is important, there will be two
oﬀsetting forces regarding how advertising inﬂuences R&D.
The goal of this paper is to study the impact of advertising on the innovation and growth
of an industry in which strategic interaction is a key element. In particular, if there is an
improvement in advertising technology, which of the two oﬀsetting forces will prevail? This
research ﬁnds that as advertising technology improves (i.e. per unit advertising cost decreases),
it is possible that the entry deterrence eﬀect of advertising dominates. Therefore, a worse
advertising technology can result in local improvements of industry innovation rates. However,
this paper ﬁnds that a complete ban on advertising always reduces industry growth.
This paper presents a variant of the Grossman and Helpman (1991) quality ladder model.
The key diﬀerence is that a new product is not known by all consumers immediately after
entry. Instead, consumers become aware of a product only gradually. In this gradual process
of product knowledge diﬀusion, the more a product is advertised, the more consumers become
1The literature on the relationship between competition and growth is much too large to cite comprehensively.
Besides Grossman and Helpman (1991), a few recent examples include Aghion and Howitt (1992), Jones (1995),
Segerstrom (1998), and Horner (2004)
1aware of the product. In this model, each ﬁrm has a particular quality level product and
invests in advertising to inform consumers about the existence of the product. Each product is
protected by a patent. Eventually, the product becomes obsolete upon patent expiration, and
the ﬁrm exits the market. Possibly before or after an incumbent’s patent expiration, a new
ﬁrm enters the market. Each entrant ﬁrm decides upon its time of entry. Upon entering, a ﬁrm
chooses how much R&D to invest in making its product better than the existing variety, and
how much advertising to make consumers aware of its new product.
This model provides a comparative static analysis of innovation, advertising and entry time
with respect to changes in advertising technology. Diﬀerent advertising technology results in
three diﬀerent ﬁrm-entry modes: blockaded entry, accommodated entry and entry deterrence.
Blockaded entry occurs when large structural entry barriers, such as an expensive advertising
technology, exist in an industry, thereby preventing future entry. Accommodated entry occurs
when advertising technology is good enough so that any entry-deterring strategies become
ineﬀective. In both blockaded and accommodated cases, advertising complements innovation.
Locally, as advertising technology improves, innovation improves, new ﬁrms enter sooner, and
industry grows at a faster rate. If advertising technology is in between the above two settings,
ﬁrms can invest heavily in advertising to strategically deter future entry. Locally, when entry
is deterred, an incumbent’s intensive advertising reduces entrant ﬁrms’ entry values, thereby
dulling incentives for innovation. Both innovation and industry growth suﬀer as a result.
This paper extends the analysis to include global comparative statics by considering the
extreme case of advertising ban. Interestingly, no-advertising-at-all proves to be much more
detrimental to innovation and growth than even heavy entry-deterring advertising.
The results of this paper are signiﬁcant due to a couple of considerations. First, this paper
extends our understanding of industry dynamics by incorporating a quantitatively important
variable: advertising. In most industries, advertising spending equals or even exceeds R&D
spending2. In particular, the pharmaceutical industry is known to be an extremely innovative
2Information comes from the Compustat company database from Standard and Poors, which contains infor-
mation for 18,000 companies.
2industry in which R&D spending is 19 percent of sales. Yet spending on advertising in this
industry is virtually the same as it is for R&D (18 percent of sales)3. Second, this paper
investigates the potential connections between public policy towards advertising and R&D. In
most countries, direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceutical products is banned, but such
advertising is legal in the United States. This model of advertising and innovation gives an
clear answer to the impact of public policy on advertising on long-run growth.
A long strand of IO literature has studied entry deterrence via advertising. Although mostly
in a static setting and failing to address the issues of R&D and industry growth, this literature
converges upon an interesting, but ambiguous result. As suggested by Schmalensee (1983)4
and Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), although advertising can lower the demand of a new entrant
ﬁrm by strengthening an incumbent’s hold on consumers, the resulting expansion in consumer
awareness creates an incentive for an incumbent to price its product higher. This increase in
proﬁt margin extends to the entrant, and may make a new ﬁrm more likely to enter.
Aside from incorporating industry R&D and industry growth, the key way that my paper
diﬀers from this literature is that I assume ﬁrms can perfectly price discriminate. That is, ﬁrms
in my paper are allowed to charge diﬀerent prices to consumers who diﬀer in product awareness.
This assumption simpliﬁes the theoretical analysis by making the eﬀect of advertising on entry
deterrence unambiguous: advertising aids entry deterrence. Indeed, this assumption allows an
incumbent to maintain a high price for those consumers who are solely aware of its product,
while it lowers its price aggressively for those consumers who are aware of both its product and
its rival’s product. This assumption eliminates the extra proﬁt margin for a potential entrant,
and thus dulls its incentive for early entry.
Pure uniform pricing, as assumed by the literature, and perfect price discrimination are two
polar case assumptions. Neither is likely to be exactly true in the real world. For example, due
to the immense complexity of the health care system, pharmaceutical companies certainly do
3Sources of the ﬁgures: 2006 Pharmaceutical Industry Proﬁle.
4Ishigaki (2000) studies Bertrand pricing competition under the Schmalensee setting. Ishigaki ﬁnds that
only mixed strategy pricing equilibria are possible.
3not charge uniform pricing to all consumers. Although pharmaceutical ﬁrms cannot perfectly
price discriminate either, the existence of such industries is enough to make an analysis of
allowing price discrimination to be of interest.
This paper is closely related to that of Doraszelski and Markovich (2005)5. These researchers
incorporate the advertising and industry dynamics in Pakes and Ericson’s (1995) framework.
They assume uniform pricing and numerically simulate results for a symmetric Markov-perfect
equilibrium. However, my paper diﬀers from that of Doraszelski and Markovich (2005) in
both its technical aspects and economic intuition. Technically, the assumption of perfect price
discrimination allows a much more tractable model. My model has no issues concerning the
existence of a pure strategy price equilibrium, and can obtain full analytical comparative static
results. As for economics, since perfect price discrimination allows the elimination of extra proﬁt
incentives for new ﬁrms to enter early, incumbent ﬁrms are more inclined to use advertising as
a deterrent.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following fashion: the model is formally
presented in the next section; Section 3 introduces the single entry case as a benchmark; Section
4 extends to a general setting with sequential entry, and deﬁnes the Stationary Markov-perfect
Equilibrium; Section 5 characterizes a stationary equilibrium with entry deterrence; Section 6
presents numerical analysis; and Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
The model is in continuous time and has an inﬁnite horizon. Firms are risk neutral and discount
the future at a rate of ρ > 0. Each ﬁrm produces a unique product, distinct in two dimensions:
consumer awareness and quality level. Each ﬁrm is, in turn, able to expand its product’s
awareness through advertising, and raise its quality through innovation. A ﬁrm operates for a
5The results of Doraszelski and Markovich (2005) indicate that strategic under-investment in advertising can
deter entry. The intuition is similar to Boyer and Moreaux (1999), although Boyer and Moreaux (1999)’s model
is static.
4ﬁnite T units of time (T is exogenous); then, its product becomes obsolete. There are, at most,
two ﬁrms in the market at any instant in time6. In addition, there is a numeraire good of which
all consumers are aware, so that the prices of the two products are bounded away from inﬁnity.
Timeline. Firms enter market sequentially, and only one ﬁrm can enter at any given instant in
time. A large number of potential entrants wait to enter at any given moment. Each potential
entry ﬁrm must decide how long to wait to enter the market after the last entry. This waiting
time is denoted by l. For example, if ﬁrm 1 enters the market at t1, and ﬁrm 2 decides the
entry time to be t2, then l2 = t2 − t1. The innovation stepsize denoted by “z” and the time
length of advertising denoted by “a” are decided at the time of a ﬁrm’s entry.
Firms pay an entry cost to enter the market. This entry cost is a function of innovation
stepsize z and waiting time l. It has the additive separative form: I(z) + ke−ηl. The cost
associated with innovation I(·) is time invariant. For simplicity, I(z) is assumed to be I · zγ
(γ ≥ 2) for the remainder of the paper. However, all of the results presented in this paper are
robust, as long as I(·) is increasing and convex in stepsize z, with I(0) = 0 and the inverse of
its derivative I0−1(·) exists and it is weakly concave. Notice that I(0) = 0 implies that the new
entrant would have at least the same quality level as its predecessor. In addition, the convexity
in innovation cost bounds the optimal solutions away from inﬁnity. The cost associated with
entry waiting time: ke−ηl implies that the more time a potential entrant waits, the better the
innovation environment, and the cheaper it is to enter the market. This provides an incentive
for ﬁrms to delay entry.
Once in the market, a ﬁrm can produce the product at zero marginal cost. And there is no
other variable costs or ﬁxed costs associated with the production process.
All ﬁrms exit after T units of time. This ﬁxed length of time can be seen as the patent
length of a new innovation. When a ﬁrm enters the market, its good is patented regardless of
quality and the patent expires after T periods. Immediately after the patent expiration, a ﬁrm’s
6Generalization to more than 2 ﬁrms is conceptually obvious. For notational convenience, this paper only
focuses on the two-product case.
5product becomes known to all consumers in the market. This patent-expired good becomes the
new numeraire good until it is replaced by the next patent-expired good.
I assume at most two patented goods can be in the market simultaneously, thereby I use
subscript i ∈ {1,2} to denote the order of entry. Firm 2 enters the market after ﬁrm 1, and
innovate over ﬁrm 1’s product. In addition, I use subscript i = 0 to denote the numeraire good.
At the time of ﬁrm 1’s product patent expiration, the ﬁrm/product subscript changes. Firm
1’s product becomes the new numeraire good indexed by “0,” ﬁrm 2 becomes the new ﬁrm “1,”
and a new entrant will be indexed as the new ﬁrm “2.”
The timeline is depicted in the following chart (To avoid confusion, at the time of product













t2 = t1 + l2
Firm 10 Expires
Firm 10 → Numeraire
?
t2 + T
New Firm 20 Enters
Chooses z20, a20
?
t20 = t2 + l20 t
From above, ﬁrm 2 enters at t2 and expires at t2+T. Firm 2 overlaps with ﬁrm 1 for t ∈ [t2,T].
After ﬁrm 2 becomes ﬁrm 10, it overlaps with ﬁrm 20 for t ∈ [t20,t2 + T].
Innovation and product quality. Consumers value a product by its quality level x. Firms
innovate to improve product quality. Innovation is modeled in a similar fashion as in Grossman
& Helpman (1991), and the quality index is continuous. Upon entry, each ﬁrm can innovate
once and only once. Firm i chooses an innovation stepsize denoted by zi. The innovation
results in an improvement in quality over the latest industry innovator; hence, innovation is
cumulative. For example, if ﬁrm 1 is the latest innovator with quality level x1, and new entrant
ﬁrm 2’s innovation stepsize is z2, then ﬁrm 2’s quality level is x2 = x1 + z2. Moreover, the
arrival of innovation is instantaneous.
Advertising and consumer awareness. There is a unit measure of consumers. The share
6of consumers who are aware of a product i is si ∈ [0,1]. When a new product is introduced,
the initial level of awareness7 is σ ∈ (0,1]. Additional consumers can only be made aware of
a new product through advertising. Once a consumer is made aware of a product, she never
forgets, hence a product’s consumer awareness level never shrinks.
For each instant in time, a ﬁrm can pay a constant ﬂow cost θ > 0 to advertise. For
each time it is advertised, a product’s awareness expands at a rate of φ > 0. A ﬁrm chooses
to advertise in ai ≥ 0 units of time after entry, and stops advertising thereafter8. Product





1 − (1 − σ)e−φt; if t ∈ [0,ai]
si(ai); if t ∈ (ai,T]
for i ∈ {1,2} (1)
Notice that once a ﬁrm stops advertising at time ai, its awareness remains constant thereafter
at si(ai). The key feature of this awareness accumulation process is the decreasing return to
advertising. This feature allows a new product to expand in market awareness quickly at the
beginning. The increasing diﬃculty in getting new consumers to know about a new product
would eventually make a ﬁrm stop advertising. Full awareness is not possible to obtain within
ﬁnite T units of time.
Consumer preference and market segmentation. Given product awareness and quality
levels, ﬁrms compete in the product market by setting prices. Consumers are homogenous in
their tastes. Consumers are indiﬀerent between x units of quality 1 products and 1 unit of
quality x product. Each consumer consumes exactly one good at each instant in time, and she
can only consume a product of which she is aware. Given the prices, the utility of a consumer
7This positive level of initial awareness can be justiﬁed as word-of-mouth advertising, see Fishman and Rob
(2003).
8Given a discount rate greater than zero, a ﬁrm would always prefer to advertise early in its life cycle. This
result is formally proven in the Technical Appendix.
9This process can be generated using a Poisson distribution, assuming that the advertising message is hitting
consumers according to this distribution (see Technical Appendix).
7from purchasing a product with quality x and price p is:
x − p
Recall that there are three products in the market: the product of the incumbent ﬁrm
denoted by “1,” product of the new entrant denoted by “2,” and the patent-expired numeraire
good denoted by “0.” Notice that consumers are diﬀerent only in the number of products of
which they are aware. Since all consumers are aware of product “0,” the market is partitioned
into four segments: the portion of consumers who are aware of both product 1 and 2, denoted
by m12; the portion who are aware of product 1, but not product 2, denoted by m1; the portion
who are aware of product 2, but not product 1, denoted m2; and the portion who are aware
of neither product 1 nor product 2, denoted by m0. In terms of consumer awareness, market
segments are deﬁned as the following:
m
12(t) = s1(t) · s2(t)
m
i(t) = si(t) · (1 − s−i(t)) for i = 1,2
m
0(t) = (1 − s1(t))(1 − s2(t))
Price discrimination and demand. The key assumption in this paper is that ﬁrms can
perfectly price discriminate across diﬀerent market segments. This assumption not only helps
to avoid dealing with the price eﬀect in entry deterrence, but also ensures that the model has a
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. For any given market segment, ﬁrms engage in a static
Bertrand competition. The pricing decisions for each segment are independent of the ﬁrm’s
other decisions. Since there is no production cost, it is easy to derive the pricing policy as the
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8In ﬁrm i’s exclusive market segment “mi,” it charges the highest possible price in order to
break even with the numeraire good. In the share market segment m12, ﬁrm 2 bids the price
down until ﬁrm 1 cannot charge a positive price, at which point ﬁrm 2 gains the whole segment.
Hence, the resulting ﬂow revenue is:
R1 = z1 · s1(1 − s2)
R2 = (z1 + z2) · s2(1 − s1) + z2 · s2s1 = z2 · s2 + z1 · s2(1 − s1)
At the time of product 1’s patent expiration, it becomes the new numeraire good in the
market. At this time of expiration, it becomes instantly known by all consumers. Meanwhile,
the market segment which is aware of product 2 but not product 1, namely m2, disappears,
insofar everyone can acquire product 1 at zero price. Because of the high proﬁtability of m2, a
ﬁrm has an incentive to enter early and secure this exclusive market for a longer time.
3 Equilibrium with A Single Entrant
In this section, I restrict the model to allow only a single entrant. Once one ﬁrm enters,
no others are allowed to enter the market. The analysis of this restricted model serves two
purposes. First, it is helpful for expositional purposes to work through the mechanics of this
simple case. Second, it can serve as a benchmark for later analysis. An equilibrium is deﬁned
in this section, and comparative statics are investigated. The key comparative statics regard
how a ﬁrm’s decisions10 on innovation stepsize “z,” advertising length “a,” and entry waiting
time “l” change with respect to lowering the advertising cost “θ”.
In this particular setting, since there is only one ﬁrm, consumers are grouped into two
market segments: those who know the product of the single entrant, and those who do not.
Since the ﬁrm competes only with the numeraire good, it charges price p = z, and all consumers
aware of its product would buy from the ﬁrm, so R(t) = z · s(t).
10Subscript i is dropped since only one single patented good exits in the market.
9Given the consumers’ product choices, an Equilibrium with Single Entry consists of optimal
decisions {zs,as,ls} (superscript “s” denotes the single entrant), and a value function V s(z,a,l)
for which the following conditions are satisﬁed:
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If there is more than one l satisfying the above condition, entry time ls is the earliest l
possible.
Here, I assume that the entry cost is high enough so that no ﬁrm can enter at time zero with
a non-negative proﬁt. The zero proﬁt condition must be satisﬁed because potential entrants
compete to enter the market. One entrant ﬁrm will choose to enter the market at the ﬁrst
possible opportunity when it can make a non-negative proﬁt.
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−ρt dt − e
−ρaθ = 0 (4)
Notice that zs and as are independent of entry time l. Regardless of when an entrant enters,
the ﬁrm always chooses the same optimal level of innovation stepsize and advertising.
In Equations (3) and (4), z is increasing in a. This result shows that innovation stepsize
and advertising are complements. Given more advertising, consumer awareness expands, and
11Because the entry ﬁxed cost ke−ηl enters the value function additive separately, the optimal decisions on z
and a do not depend on the entry time l.
10it becomes more proﬁtable to increase innovation stepsize. Meanwhile, innovation becomes
increasingly more expensive, and the marginal beneﬁt of innovation shrinks. On the other
hand, if a higher innovation stepsize raises the prices charged in the advertised market segment,
a ﬁrm would have a higher incentive to invest in advertising. However, advertising becomes
increasingly more diﬃcult in reaching a higher proportion of the population, so the marginal
beneﬁt of advertising also decreases.
Proposition 1. An equilibrium exists in the single entry case, and it is always unique.
Proof. First, I show that for any parameters, a ﬁrm always chooses to enter and innovate at
a positive stepsize z. Notice that a ﬁrm always enters given enough waiting time, since the
ﬁxed entry cost ke−ηt goes to zero as t → ∞. As the cost approaches zero, a ﬁrm can innovate
z = ε > 0 arbitrarily small at which point
R
e−ρt dt > I · εγ−1. At this point, even when a ﬁrm
does not advertise at all, it can make a strictly positive proﬁt by entering the market. This
also shows that given a (z,a) pair, there is always a l > 0 satisfying the zero proﬁt condition.
Next, if a ﬁrm enters the market, then it innovates at z > 0. This is obvious, since if z = 0, a
ﬁrm competes with the numeraire good and can only charge price p = 0. However, the entry
cost is strictly positive, so a ﬁrm cannot enter the market without a positive innovation.
The above statement states that a market can be in either three cases: a corner case in
which a = 0, a corner case in which a = T, or an interior solution. Next I look into each of
the three cases. If a ﬁrm does not advertise (a = 0), its market awareness stays at the initial
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γ
Therefore, z = [σ
R T
t=0 e−ρt dt/(Iγ)]1/(γ−1); consequently, an equilibrium exists and is unique.
The result of the corner solution case in which a = T follows a similar rationale.
I next look into the interior case in which Equations (3) and (4) are both satisﬁed. I can
11rewrite these two equations as the following functions:






Equation (4) → e e z(a) =
θρ
φ(1 − σ)e−φa(1 − e−ρ(T−a))
It can be easily veriﬁed that e z(a) is increasing and concave in a, and that e e z(a) is increasing
and convex in a.
In a space where where “a” is on the x-axis and “z” is on the y-axis, a typical example of
e z(a) and e e z(a) is illustrated in Figure 1. In this ﬁgure, the e z(a) is represented by the blue solid
line and e e z(a) is represented by the red dotted line.
The potential equilibrium (z,a) pair satisﬁes both equations. Therefore, it must be an
intersection point of e z(a) and e e z(a). As shown in Figure 1, it is possible that these two functions
equal at 2 points. However, there is a local maximum only when the slope of e e z(a) is greater
than the slope e z(a) (negative semi-deﬁnite Hessian matrix), and the second order suﬃcient
condition is satisﬁed. Thus, a unique equilibrium exists.
Next, I turn my attention to the comparative statics of optimal decisions with respect to
a change in the advertising cost θ. From ﬁrst order conditions, it is clear that a change in
advertising cost θ would not aﬀect Equation (3), nor would it aﬀect the decision on innovation
stepsize z directly. However, a change in θ would change Equation (4), and a higher cost
in advertising would reduce a ﬁrm’s incentive to advertise, thereby indirectly reducing the
incentive to innovate.
Proposition 2. Under equilibrium with a single entry, zs and as decrease, and ls increases
with respect to the advertising cost θ.
Proof. This statement is obvious in the corner solutions for a = 0 and a = T. I then focus
on the interior case. As shown in Figure 1, an increase in θ shifts e e z(a) upward, while e z(a) is
unchanged. Due to the properties of both e e z(a) and e z(a), it is clear that zs and as both decrease.
12I next turn my attention to the optimal entry time ls. Consider θ1 < θ2, and call the payoﬀ
maximizing (z,a) pair (z1,a1) and (z2,a2) respectively. Also deﬁne the “zero proﬁt” waiting
time l1 and l2. Holding all else equal, V s(z2,a2,l1|θ2) < V s(z2,a2,l1|θ1), simply because θ1 < θ2.
Then since (z1,a1) are payoﬀ maximizing after entry, then V s(z2,a2,l1|θ1) ≤ V s(z1,a1,l1|θ1).
By the zero proﬁt condition, for all i = 1,2, V s(zi,ai,li|θi) = 0. Then V s(z2,a2,l1|θ2) <
V s(z1,a1,l1|θ1) = V s(z2,a2,l2|θ2), and this implies that l1 < l2, hence proving the claim.
This result is intuitive because a lowering in advertising cost θ raises the ﬁrm’s incentive
to advertise. Since advertising and innovation are complementary, innovation stepsize corre-
spondingly increases upon entry. The raised proﬁtability upon entry caused by increases in both
advertising and innovation eﬀorts prompts ﬁrms to enter at an earlier date. The immediate
implication of Proposition 2 is that the innovation growth rate z/l increases as θ is lowered.
Next, this paper looks into the general case in which sequential entries are allowed.
4 Equilibrium with Sequential Entry
In contrast to the restricted model with single entry, the general model allows multiple ﬁrms to
enter the market sequentially. Each one brings a new innovation into the market and generates
industry growth.
A notion of the Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) for the model with sequential entry is
deﬁned in this section. Given the consumers’ product choices, an MPE with at most two ﬁrms
overlapping consists of:
1. The Payoﬀ Relevant states are summarized by the vector {¯ z,¯ a}. At the time of a ﬁrm’s
entry, ¯ z and ¯ a are its predecessor ﬁrm’s innovation stepsize and advertising respectively.
Notice that the entry time of the predecessor ﬁrm is irrelevant to the new entry ﬁrm’s
decision-making; thus, I normalize the predecessor entry time to be ¯ l = 0.
2. At the time of entry, a ﬁrm chooses innovation stepsize z and advertising length a to
13maximize the entry value given (¯ z,¯ a) and given a new ﬁrm enters the market following
the entry time policy function b l(z,a)12.
max
z,a
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−ρtθ dt − Iz
γ − ke
−ηl + V C(z,a)
The resulting optimal policy functions are denoted b z(¯ z,¯ a) and b a(¯ z,¯ a).
3. V C is the incumbent ﬁrm’s value after a new ﬁrm’s entry, given that the new ﬁrm follows












1 − (1 − σ)e−φt; if t ∈ [0,b a(z,a)]
1 − (1 − σ)e−φb a(z,a); if t ∈ (b a(z,a),b l(z,a)]
4. The Zero Proﬁt condition holds:
b V (b z,b a,l|¯ z,¯ a) = 0
If there is more than one l satisfying the above condition, the entry time is the earliest l
possible. The resulting policy on the entry time l is b l(·).
The Markov-perfect equilibrium consists of policy rules {b z,b a,b l}, and the value function b V .
For the analysis of this paper, I restrict my attention to a Stationary MPE. The Stationary
MPE consists of {z∗,a∗,l∗} and the value function V ∗, where z∗ = b z(z∗,a∗), a∗ = b a(z∗,a∗),
12Here, I focus only on the case in which ﬁrms do not overlap in advertising. Parameters are such that a ﬁrm
enters after the incumbent ﬁrm has stopped advertising.
14l∗ = b l(z∗,a∗) and V ∗(z∗,a∗,l∗) = b V (z∗,a∗,l∗|z∗,a∗)13.
Under this notion of equilibrium, I ﬁrst look into the entry blockaded case.
4.1 Blockaded Entry
For some parameters, the equilibrium solution in the single entry case {zs,as,ls} also constitutes
a Stationary Markov-perfect Equilibrium in the sequential entry case. In particular, this is the
case when advertising cost θ is high enough to block all possible entry within the duration of
an incumbent’s patent length: this is the case of blockaded entry.
I ﬁrst look at how the value function behaves under the blockaded entry case. Given that
the successor ﬁrm can optimally enter the market only after its patent expiration, b l(z,a) ≥ T,
a ﬁrm’s value function V b is deﬁned as the following:
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I denote the optimal policies (zb,ab), which maximize V b given predecessor’s decisions (¯ z,¯ a).
In addition, I denote lb to be the entry time satisfying the zero proﬁt condition. Then {zb,ab,lb}
and V b constitute a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium if ¯ z = zb, ¯ a = ab, and an entry
ﬁrm chooses lb > T. This equilibrium only exists if the advertising cost is high enough. To
characterize this equilibrium and make comparisons to other cases of a stationary MPE, I ﬁrst
introduce two deﬁnitions:
Deﬁnition 1. 14 Given that all ﬁrms choose zb and ab, θ is the advertising cost at which for
13In general, a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium exists following similar intuitions as those in Dorazelski
and Satterthwaite (2003). However, the following analysis does not rely on their results.
14Notice that at θ = θ, the zero proﬁt waiting time l may not be equal to T, since the value function may
not be monotone in the waiting time l. Thus, θ is not the θ in which ls(θ) = 0.
15all θ > θ, the entry time lb > T; and for all θ < θ, the entry time lb < T.
Implicit in the above deﬁnition is that lb is monotone increasing in θ, or a ﬁrm’s entry time
gets delayed with rising advertising costs. This is true following the same intuition as in the
single entry case, which is proven formally in Proposition 2.
Notice that V b may be diﬀerent from V ∗, because in V b, b l(z,a) ≥ T is always the case, but
in V ∗, it is possible that b l(z,a) < T. Therefore, similar to the deﬁnition of θ, I can deﬁne θ for
V ∗:
Deﬁnition 2. Given that all ﬁrms choose z∗ and a∗, θ is the advertising cost at which for all
θ > θ, the entry time l∗ > T; and for all θ < θ, the entry time l∗ < T.
Notice that θ ≥ θ. This is because V ∗ ≤ V b for any {z,a,l}. Next, I characterize the
stationary MPE under the blockaded entry case:
Proposition 3. For all θ > θ, the policies {zb,ab,lb} and the value function V b constitute a
Stationary MPE, if and only if zb = zs, ab = as, lb = ls and V b(zb,ab,lb) = V s(zs,as,ls).
Proof. Since θ > θ, lb > T, thus, there is no ﬁrm overlapping in the market at any time, so
V ∗ = V s. I have already shown in the single entry case, (zs,as) maximizes the value function
V s given the entry time. Additionally, the entry time ls satisﬁes the zero proﬁt condition under
the value function V s. Hence, if zb = zs, ab = as, lb = ls and V b(zb,ab,lb) = V s(zs,as,ls), the
policies {zb,ab,lb} and the value function V b constitutes an MPE. The proof of stationarity is
obvious.
I next show that if the policies {zb,ab,lb} and the value function V b constitute a Stationary
MPE, then zb = zs, ab = as, lb = ls and V b(zb,ab,lb) = V s(zs,as,ls). If l > T and V ∗ = V s, I
have already shown that the equilibrium with (zs,as,ls) is unique. The only thing remaining
to be shown is that for any l < T, a ﬁrm can only make a negative proﬁt. This is clear, since
by the deﬁnition of θ, for all θ > θ, even if a ﬁrm optimally chooses zb and ab, it will still enter
at lb > T.
16Since zb = zs, ab = as, lb = ls and V b(zb,ab,lb) = V s(zs,as,ls), I derive the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. Under a Stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium with blockaded entry, zb and ab
decrease, and lb increases with respect to the advertising cost θ.
If θ < θ, a ﬁrm would have an incentive to enter the market before its predecessor has
exited. Then a couple of questions arise: is it possible to strategically innovate and advertise in
order to deter a successor’s entry time? If this is possible, what is the implication for industry
growth? Next, I introduce a notion of entry deterrence and answer the above questions.
5 Entry Deterrence
In some equilibrium settings, each entrant ﬁrm enters the market after the previous incumbent’s
patent expiration. However, dissimilar to the entry blockaded setting, each incumbent ﬁrm
chooses to advertise and innovate diﬀerently from the levels of the single entry case (zs,as). This
deviation from the equilibrium optimality under no entry threat must be due to incumbents’
strategic concerns of entry deterrence. Intuitively, an incumbent manipulate its own advertising
in order to delay a new entry. In doing so, an incumbent gains a higher proﬁtability.
In this section, I deﬁne a stationary MPE under entry deterrence, shows its existence,
explores comparative statics with respect to the advertising cost θ, and compare the optimal
decisions with the blockaded entry setting.
An Entry Deterrence Equilibrium is a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium in which l∗ >
T, but z∗ 6= zs and a∗ 6= as.
In an entry deterrence setting, a ﬁrm chooses z and a not only to maximize its after entry
proﬁt, but also to force potential entrants to wait until after its patent expiration, or b l(z,a) > T.
In other words, given (z,a), no ﬁrm can make a non-negative proﬁt by entering before T. To
make sure of this, I ﬁrst need to ﬁnd out at what entry time l < T a potential entrant attains
a maximum value.
17Lemma 1. For any given pair of (¯ z,¯ a), V b attains a unique local maximum at an entry time
l ∈ (0,T).
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
The above lemma shows that for l < T, V b takes an “inverted U” shape, as depicted in
Figure 2. This shape is the result of two opposing forces. When t is small, V b increases in t
because ﬁxed entry costs are reduced sharply. Then V b starts to decrease because the beneﬁt of
proﬁting from a lower quality numeraire good declines with the predecessor’s patent expiration
quickly approaching. I then can deﬁne the unique local maximum point lmax as the following:
Deﬁnition 3. For any such (¯ z,¯ a), V b attains a local maximum at lmax(¯ z,¯ a) < T.
Since this interior maximum point must be attained where the slope of V b with respect to
l is zero, lmax satisﬁes the following:
W
0(l
max(¯ z,¯ a))¯ z(1 − σ)e
−φ¯ a + kηe
−ηlmax(¯ z,¯ a) = 0 (5)
To deter entry, a ﬁrm must choose (z,a) so that:
V
b(z,a,l
max(z,a)) < 0 (6)
Then an entering ﬁrm solves the following problem:
max
z,a V
b(z,a,l) subject to: Inequality (6)
Denote (zd,ad) to be the optimal decisions solving the above problem, and lb > T satisﬁes the






Notice that Equations (5) and (6) deﬁne a functional relationship between zd and ad. We can
18call this function zd(ad). Then the ﬁrst order necessary condition for an interior maximum is:
θρ
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γ−1) = 0 (7)
Given thatθ ∈ (θ,θ], zd and ad have to satisfy both Equations (5) and (6). Hence, it is easy
to verify that zd 6= zs and ad 6= as. Moreover, ld > T; therefore, {zd,ad,ld} and V b constitute







(1 − σ)e−φa is increasing in a.
Proposition 4. Given that Assumption 1 holds, there exists an ε > 0 that is arbitrarily close
to zero, and for a θ = θ − , an Entry Deterrence Equilibrium exists.
Proof. Essentially, the above statement is equivalent to proving that θ > θ, or ∃θ ∈ (θ,θ), such
that V b(zb,ab,lmax(zb,ab)|θ) > 0 > V ∗(z∗,a∗,lmax(z∗,a∗)|θ).
For any θ < θ, V b(zb,ab,lmax(zb,ab)) ≥ V b(zb,ab,lmax(z∗,a∗)), this is true by the deﬁnition
of lmax(zb,ab). Also V b(zb,ab,lmax(z∗,a∗)) ≥ V b(z∗,a∗,lmax(z∗,a∗)) because (zb,ab) are the op-
timal decisions given V b. In addition, V b(z∗,a∗,lmax(z∗,a∗)) > V ∗(z∗,a∗,lmax)(z∗,a∗)) because
lmax(z∗,a∗) < T. Then deﬁne χ(θ) = V b(z∗,a∗,lmax(zb,ab)|θ) − V ∗(z∗,a∗,lmax(z∗,a∗)|θ). Then
χ(θ) > 0 for any θ < θ.
Furthermore, V b(zb,ab,lmax) = 0 for θ = θ. Given Assumption 1, I know that zb(1−σ)e−φab
is decreasing in θ. Thus, for any l < T, W(l)zb(1 − σ)e−φab is decreasing in θ. In other
words, V b shifts up as the advertising cost θ is lowered, then ∃ε > 0 is small enough, so
that V b(zb,ab,lmax(zb,ab)|θ − ε) − V b(zb,ab,lmax(zb,ab)|θ) <  < χ(θ − ε). This implies that
V ∗(z∗,a∗,lmax(z∗,a∗)|θ−ε) < 0. Also, by deﬁnition of θ, θ−ε > θ. Hence, an Entry Deterrence
Equilibrium exists at θ − ε.
In fact, the above proposition has shown that the Entry Deterrence equilibrium exists for
all θ ∈ (θ,θ]. How value functions vary with respect to θ is illustrated in Figure 3. Next, I
investigate the comparative statics within the Entry Deterrence Equilibrium with respect to
changes in the advertising cost θ.
19Proposition 5. Given that θ ∈ (θ,θ], if θ decreases, and the model has an interior solution, the
innovation stepsize zd decreases, the advertising ad increases, and the entry time ld decreases,
but is always greater than T, as well as the innovation growth rate zd/ld decreases.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
As noted in the single entry case, advertising and innovation are complementary. An increase
in one raises the marginal beneﬁt of the other. Thus, as advertising cost is lowered, both
advertising length a and innovation stepsize z go up. However, in the entry deterrence case,
lowering advertising cost puts increasing pressure on the incumbent to delay entry. As an
incumbent ﬁrm raises its advertising investment, this would eﬀectively shrink the size of the
new entrant exclusive market segment m2. In doing so, the marginal proﬁtability of innovation
decreases, and each subsequent entrant innovates less. In addition, the value function for l > T
continues to rise as θ falls, causing l to decrease. Due to the signiﬁcant loss in z, the overall
eﬀect on industry growth z/l is negative.




t=0 e−ρts(t) dt − Iγ(zd(a))γ−1 is decreasing in a.
Proposition 6. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, given that θ ∈ (θ,θ], zd < zb and ad > ab. Also
ld > lb. Thus, zd/ld < zb/lb.
Proof. See Technical Appendix.
Compared to the blockaded entry setting, a ﬁrm tends to over-invest in advertising in order
to deter entry. As a result, the industry growth rate is lower in the entry deterrence case.
6 Numerical Analysis
The analysis so far has focused on the comparative statics of innovation stepsize and growth
with respect to local changes in advertising cost. This section extends these local results by
20considering numerical examples that illustrate the eﬀect of a global policy change.
The main focus of this section centers on how a comprehensive ban on advertising (θ = +∞)
inﬂuences the market. The eﬀects of an increase in advertising costs on innovation can be
subtle. The analytical results have shown that innovation stepsize and growth can be reduced
as advertising costs rise, as in the case of blockaded entry; however, innovation and growth can
also be higher, as in the case of entry deterrence. Despite the ambiguity in local comparative
statics, results from this section show that a complete ban on advertising always proves to be
detrimental to growth, even compared to the case of entry deterrence.
In addition, the analysis in this section extends the model beyond the two outcomes on
which this paper has focused so far. This section considers numerical examples that illustrate
both of these possibilities, blockaded entry and entry deterrence, as well as a third case. In this
third case, entry occurs suﬃciently frequent that ﬁrms overlap 15. The equilibrium comparative
statics in this case are similar to those of blockaded entry. An improvement in advertising (i.e., a
reduction in “θ”) leads to higher advertising spending, higher innovation stepsize, shorter entry
time, and higher industry growth. Finally, I can show that in the case of entry deterrence,
ﬁrms over-invest in advertising compared to the case of blockaded entry.
I have veriﬁed that the qualitative results above on the following grid of parameters: patent
length16 T ∈ [1,20] with an increment size of 1; initial awareness level σ ∈ [0.01,0.5] with
an increment size of 0.01; the advertising diﬀusion rate φ ∈ [0.01,1] with an increment size
of 0.01; the entry cost parameters γ ∈ [2,10] with an increment size of 0.5, I ∈ [0.1,2] with
an increment size of 0.1, k ∈ [0.01,1] with an increment size of 0.01 and η ∈ [1,3] with an
increment size of 0.01.
Moreover, in the model presented above, I use a speciﬁc functional form of innovation
cost I(z) = I · zγ. In this section, I allow for more ﬂexibility and have tested the model for
the following functional form (the functional forms must satisfy the assumptions that I(·) is
15I do not present the analytical results of the overlapping case in this paper. Analytical results are possible
with additional assumptions. Please contact the author if interested.
16I assume that the patent length is 20 years and ﬁrm discount future at 98.5% annually. Hence, for each
patent length T, there is a corresponding discount rate. For example, if T = 1, a year is 1
20T, so ρ = 0.3.
21increasing and convex in stepsize z, with I(0) = 0 and the inverse of its derivative I0−1(·) exists
and it is weakly concave): I(z) = I · (eγ·z − 1) for the range of parameters I ∈ [0.1,2] with an
increment size of 0.01 and γ ∈ [1,10] with an increment size of 0.5.
The qualitative implications are robust if the parameters and functional forms satisfy the
following three conditions. First, Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed, these assumptions are
needed to ensure that there is a region of entry deterrence. Second, the parameters must be
such that no three ﬁrms overlap in their entry. Third, the parameters must be such that no two
ﬁrms overlap in their advertising. All of the results are qualitatively the same to the following
representative example.
For the example I illustrate here, the parameters are the following: the patent length is set
to be T = 1; the discount rate ρ = 0.3; the entry cost functional form is 0.6·z2 +0.06·e1·l; the
advertising diﬀusion rate φ = 0.3, and the initial awareness level σ = 0.2. I vary the advertising
cost θ in the interval [0.005,0.015], with an increment size of 0.0005.
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of the value function shifts as the advertising cost is low-
ered. Speciﬁcally, I compare the value functions in the blockaded case V b and in the stationary
Markov-perfect equilibrium V ∗, when innovation stepsize and advertising are optimally cho-
sen. Here V b and V ∗ are both functions of the entry time l. In case (a), θ1 > θ, V ∗ = V b,
and all ﬁrms enter at l > T. In cases (b) and (c), θ ∈ (θ,θ), ﬁrms deter entry, as a result,
V ∗ = V d < V b, and ﬁrms’ entry times are delayed to l > T. Comparing cases (b) and (c),
θ2 > θ3, V d is distorted further and further away from V b, and the entry time l gets closer and
closer to T. In case (d), θ4 < θ, two ﬁrms overlap in the market, V ∗ < V d, l < T.
For each equilibrium indicated in Figure 3, I can determine the optimal innovation stepsize
z, advertising a, entry time l, and innovation growth rate z/l. Figure 4 shows the comparative
statics of these quantities with respect to advertising cost θ. In the ﬁgures, advertising cost is
on the x-axis and is in reverse order; hence, the advertising costs decreases from left to right.
Clearly, Figure 4 shows the optimal quantities under a complete advertising ban. It is clear that
ﬁrms innovate at a much lower stepsize, and the entry is infrequent. The resulting industry
22growth z/l is much less even than in the entry deterrence case.
In addition, for this particular example, θ is approximately 0.0115 and θ is approximately
0.0075. As shown, if θ > θ, or in the blockaded case, as the advertising cost θ drops, z increases,
a increases, l decreases and z/l increases as shown in the analytical results. When θ < θ, in the
overlapped entry case, as θ decreases, the comparative statics are exactly the same as they are
in the blockaded case. The exception is when θ ∈ (θ,θ], in which entry deterrence occurs. As
a result, as θ decreases, z decreases, and a increases, l decreases but kept above T. Industry
growth z/l decreases.
Finally, Table 1 compares {zb,ab,lb} with {zd,ad,ld} for those advertising costs θ ∈ (θ,θ].
The important conclusion to keep in mind is that ﬁrms under entry threat, over-invest in
advertising so as to keep rival entry time l > T. As a result, the industry growth slows down
for all of these θ’s.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀect of ﬁrms’ strategic behavior in advertising on industry innovation.
A novel feature of this model is the assumption of perfect price discrimination. By allowing
ﬁrms to price discriminate across diﬀerent groups of consumers, this paper presents a fully
tractable model and analytically characterizes equilibrium behavior under entry deterrence in
a dynamic setting.
I found in this paper that advertising can act as tool for entry deterrence. As a result, as
advertising technology improves, it is possible that the industry innovation rate will slow down.
In addition, this paper shows that although it is locally possible that industry growth improves
as advertising becomes worse, a complete ban on advertising always reduces industry growth.
For future research considerations, this paper can consider the diﬀerent eﬀects that adver-
tising may have on consumer perceptions (other than the awareness eﬀect), such as the prestige
eﬀect, the brand name eﬀect, etc. In this paper, consumers are assumed to be passive at all
23times. Ackerberg (2003) provides a good example as to how one may incorporate diﬀerent
eﬀects of advertising into a consumer-learning environment. In addition, it would be of interest
to extend this model to include diﬀerentiated products (i.e. Grossman and Shapiro (1984)) and
directions of technological innovation (i.e. Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006)). Fleshing out these
issues would surely require more detailed and complex modeling than has been attempted in
this paper.
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(d) θ = θ4
Figure 3: Entry Value as a Function of Entry Time l given (θ1 > θ2 > θ3 > θ4)




































(d) Innovation Growth z/l
Figure 4: Optimal Policy Function With Decreasing Advertising Cost
29Blockaded Entry
θ z a l z/l
0.0115 0.2136 0.31016 0.38826 0.55015
0.011 0.21404 0.3228 0.31806 0.67297
0.0105 0.21447 0.33542 0.25128 0.85352
0.01 0.21487 0.34801 0.21996 0.97687
0.0095 0.21525 0.36057 0.19148 1.1241
0.009 0.2156 0.37312 0.16541 1.3035
0.0085 0.21594 0.38565 0.14141 1.527
0.008 0.21625 0.39817 0.11919 1.8143
Entry Deterrence
θ z a l z/l
0.0115 0.21324 0.31069 1.1478 0.18579
0.011 0.21029 0.32735 1.1321 0.18575
0.0105 0.20721 0.34456 1.117 0.18551
0.01 0.20399 0.36237 1.1026 0.18501
0.0095 0.20063 0.38087 1.0889 0.18424
0.009 0.19688 0.39897 1.0763 0.18292
0.0085 0.19298 0.41876 1.0649 0.18121
0.008 0.18874 0.43957 1.0551 0.17889
Table 1: Contrasting Entry Deterrence with Blockaded Entry
.
30Technical Appendix
Accumulation of Product Awareness Follows Poisson Process
Assume that the number of times a particular product’s advertising information reaches a
consumer in a ﬁxed period of time follows a Poisson distribution. For a particular product
entered the market in time r, for all t ∈ [r,r + T], let λ(t) =
R t
j=r A(j)φ dj, then prob(H(t) =
x) =
e−λ(t)λ(t)x
x! . A(j) is an indicator function of advertising. A(j) = 1 indicates that the ﬁrm
advertises in period j, A(j) = 0 if otherwise. φ > 0 is the exogenous diﬀusion rate of per unit
time advertising. H(t) is the number of times a consumer was exposed to the advertising up
until period t. Therefore the total fraction of consumers see the advertisement at least once at
t is the ﬁrm’s “consumer awareness” at t.
s(t) = σ + (1 − e
−λ(t))(1 − σ) = 1 − (1 − σ) · e
−λ(t)
In general, the above equation can be written for any give t0 > t. Where
s(t




The above equation also provides the law of motion for the accumulation of market knowledge.
˙ s(t) = (1 − s(t)) · A(t)φ
This equation indicates that the return to advertising is marginally decreasing.
Proof: Advertising function A(·) can be replaced by a
Proof. I prove this proposition by constructing a step function with A(t) = 1 ∀t < a and
A(t) = 0 otherwise. I show that this function attains weakly higher value than any advertising
31function for a given pair of z and l. Since z and l are both ﬁxed for the following analysis,
I only consider the value function without the innovation cost I(z) + ke−ηl. In Blockaded














− A(i + t)θ
i
di
Claim 1: Firm would never advertise for just a instant of length zero, because by not advertising
at all, ﬁrm would be strictly better oﬀ by saving θ > 0 in that period and keep the same market
size.
Claim 2: Now suppose ﬁrm advertises ε > 0 continuously, where ε < T +r −t. Firm is always
better oﬀ by advertising in the periods [t,t + ε], or by not advertising at all. Deﬁne the value




















After period t + ε + ∆, s(·) and A(·) becomes the same for both schemes, so the values cancel
out.







· (1 − e





ρ+φ · (1 − e−ε(ρ+φ)) − (1 − e−ρε) · θ ≥ 0, V d(∆) is increasing and concave, otherwise,
it is decreasing and convex. So the minimum is either V d(0) or V d(∞), this is equivalent as
saying comparing to any other schemes, ﬁrm is always better oﬀ by advertising in the periods
[t,t+ε] if
φz(1−s(t))
ρ+φ ·(1−e−ε(ρ+φ))−(1−e−ρε)·θ ≥ 0; otherwise ﬁrm is better oﬀ by indeﬁnitely
delaying advertising thus by not advertising at all.
32Now, given any A(·) function, we can construct a step function that is superior in the
following way: First, by Claim 1 I can take out all the instants of advertising. Then starting
backwards from t = r +T and going towards r, if continuous periods of advertising occur after
t, use the criteria established in Claim 2, I can either delete advertising or make ﬁrm advertise
starting at t. Continue this process until I hit t = r, the resulting function A0(·) must be at
least weakly superior to A(·). And by construction, ∃a ∈ [r,r + T] that A0(t) = 1, ∀t ≤ a and
A0(t) = 0, ∀t > a.
In Overlapping Entry Case, consider at any t ∈ [r,T + r1). The cumulative value of a

















− A(i + t)θ
i
di
where s1(i+t) = 1−(1−s1(t))·e
−
R i
j=0 A1(j+t)φ dj. Since both z1 and A1 are exogenous to the ﬁrm’s
decision, the same argument for Blockaded Entry Case (with z replaced by (z+z1·s1(i+t))
) can be used to show: Claim 1: If the ﬁrm advertise a cumulatively positive amount ε > 0
during [r,T + r1), it’s always weakly better to advertise in [r,r + ε].
Now suppose that z1 · s1(i + t) = 0. Consider at any t ∈ [r,r2). The cumulative value of a













− A(i + t)θ
i
di
then with exactly the same argument as above, if ﬁrm advertise at all during this period of
time, say ε > 0, ﬁrm is always weakly better to advertise in [r,r+ε]. Now since z1·s1(i+t) > 0,
there is additional incentive for the ﬁrm to advertise early, so the following is true:
Claim 2: If the ﬁrm advertise a cumulatively positive amount ε > 0 during [r,r2), it’s always
weakly better to advertise in [r,r + ε].
For advertising decisions in period [r2,T +r], the cumulative value of the ﬁrm in [r2,T +r]






















where 1 − s2(i + r2) = (1 − σ) · e
−
R i
j=r2 A2(n;z,A)φ dj. Since I have shown in Claim 1 that the
successor ﬁrm would advertise in the beginning of its product’s life, I can use a2(z,A) to
represent A2(n;z,A) and write:
1 − s
2(i + r




e−(i−r2)φ, if i − r2 ≤ a2(z,A)
e−a2(z,A)φ, if otherwise
Suppose now 1−s2(i+r2) = 1 for all i > r2, and suppose that θ is large enough that the ﬁrm
advertises less than T/2 (in essence, no accommodated entry of advertising), then regardless of
what r2 is, I can use the argument in Blockaded Entry Case to show that if ﬁrm advertise
at all during [r,T + r], say ε > 0, ﬁrm is always weakly better to advertise in [r,r + ε]. Now,
I know that 1 − s2(i + r2) ≤ 1, = 1 for all i ∈ [L + r1,r2) and < 1 for all i ∈ [r2,r + L], so
actually regardless of where r2 is, the ﬁrm would actually have at least weakly less incentive to
advertise. So Claim 3 holds true:
Claim 3: Let θ be large enough, so that the ﬁrm advertises less than T/2 (in essence, no
accommodated entry of advertising). Then regardless of what r2 is, if the ﬁrm advertise a
cumulatively positive amount ε > 0 during [r,r + T], it’s always weakly better to advertise in
[r,r + ε].
Now it only remains to see that if θ small and accommodated entry of advertising occurs,
whether the ﬁrm would choose to advertise in the beginning of its successor’s lifetime. Since
1s2(i + r2) is weakly decreasing, it has to be true that:
Claim 4: If the ﬁrm advertise a cumulatively positive amount ε > 0 during [r2,r+T], it’s always
weakly better to advertise in [r2,r2+ε]. Combine Claim 3 and Claim 4, use the same backward
construction method described in Blockaded Entry Case, the statement of Overlapping
34Entry Case is proven.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Deﬁne the slope of V b with respect to l to be:
Vl(l) = W
0(l)¯ z(1 − σ)e
−φ¯ a + kηe
−ηl
Where W 0(l) = −e−ρ(T−l)(1 − (1 − σ)e−φ(T−l)). Then:
Vl(0) = −e
−ρT(1 − (1 − σ)e
−φT)(1 − σ)¯ ze
−φ¯ a + kηe
−ηl
Vl(T) = −σ(1 − σ)¯ ze
−φ¯ a + kηe
−ηl
To prove the “Inverted U” Shape of V b hold for any ¯ z and any ¯ a, I assume the corner solutions









−ρT(1 − (1 − σ)e
−φT)(1 − σ)e z(T) + kηe
−ηl
Vl(T) = −σ(1 − σ)e z(0) + kηe
−ηl
Then Vl(0) > −σe z(T)+kηe−ηl > 0. This is true because the assumption that no ﬁrm can make
a positive proﬁt entering at l = 0. This shows that the slope of V b is positive at l = 0.
Also if it is possible for a ﬁrm to enter at a l < T at all, it must be true that the entry ﬁxed
cost is decreasing fast enough so that at the moment of predecessor ﬁrm’s expiration, ﬁrm 2







which in turn implies that Vl(T) < 0. Since Vl is continuous, then Vl = 0 for some l ∈ (0,T).
35Furthermore, since both W(l) and V s are monotone in l, there must be a unique l at which








Also deﬁne ˆ qd = zd(1 − σ)e−φad. Further deﬁne:
χ














Claim 1: ˆ qd is decreasing as θ is lowered. Suppose ∃θ1 > θ2, where both θ’s are in (θ,θ],
and ˆ q1 < ˆ q2. By deﬁnition of z2 and a2, I know that V b(z2,a2,l|θ2) < 0 for any l ≤ T, so
a ﬁrm would not enter before T. But by deviating to z1 and a1, it’s clear that at lmax
1 < T,
b V (z1,a1,lmax
1 |z2,a2,θ2) > V b(z1,a1,lmax
1 |θ1) = 0, so given ˆ q1 < ˆ q2, a successor ﬁrm can ﬁnd a
proﬁtable deviation to enter before T. This is a contradiction to the fact that z2 and a2 are
optimal under entry deterrence, hence ˆ q1 ≥ ˆ q2. Now suppose ˆ q1 = ˆ q2, then z and a would
remain the same. Since θ is lower, at l1, b V (z1,a1,lmax
1 |z1,a1,θ2) > 0, this violates the entry
deterrence conditions. So ˆ q1 > ˆ q2.
Claim 2: z is decreasing and a is increasing as θ is lowered. From the ﬁrst order condition of








Assume z is increasing instead. At θ, it’s true that ∂V b/∂a = ∂V b/∂z = 0. Then since z
is increasing, ∂V/∂a > 0 and ∂V/∂z < 0. Also because ˆ q is decreasing by Claim 1, then a is















∂a is decreasing in magnitude and ∂V b
∂z is increasing in magnitude due to increase
in zd, hence zd decreases, this gives a contradiction. So zd is decreasing. Given zd is decreasing,
then ∂V b/∂a < 0 and ∂V b/∂z > 0. Suppose that ad is decreasing, then by the similar reasons
as above, I have a contradiction. Hence ad is increasing.
Claim 3: l is decreasing as θ is lowered. Since ˆ q is decreasing, χd(a|ˆ q,θ) must be increasing
as θ is lowered. Or else, for any l, V b(z1,a1,l|θ1) > V b(z2,a2,l|θ2), violating equation (6) and
the Zero Proﬁt Condition. Since χd(a|ˆ q,θ) increases, it must be true l > L is decreasing, since
W(l)ˆ q = 0. As depicted in Figure 3., the entry time under Entry Deterrence decreases from t1
to t2, as advertising cost is reduced from θ1 to θ2.
Claim 4: z/l is decreasing when θ is decreasing. First of all, by Claim 3, l decreases as ˆ q
decreases, it’s easy to show that ˆ q/l is decreasing as θ is lowered. On the other hand, eφa · l is








Since θ ∈ (θ,θ], I know that ld > T > lmax(zb,ab) ≥ lb.
Next I focus on z and a. Because zb and ab maximize after entry payoﬀ, so for any l,
V b(zb,ab,l) ≥ V b(zd,ad,l).
First of all, zd · (1 − σ)e−φad < zb · (1 − σ)e−φab. This is immediate, because an incumbent
ﬁrm can only reduce new entrant’s value by decreasing z · (1 − σ)e−φa. If on the contrary
zd · (1 − σ)e−φad ≥ zb · (1 − σ)e−φab, a new entrant’s value to enter early is weakly increased,
37rendering entry deterrence unsuccessful. This eliminate the case where zd > zb and ad < ab.
Then notice that R0(a)z = z · (1 − σ)e−φaφe−ρa−e−ρT
ρ . Since (zb,ab) satisﬁes equation (4), it
must be true that zb·(1−σ)e−φab =
θρ
φ(1−e−ρ(T−ab)) > zd·(1−σ)e−φad. Now suppose zd > zb, then
since zd·(1−σ)e−φad < zb·(1−σ)e−φab, it must be true that ad > ab. In addition, by Assumption
1, I have R(ad)−Iγ(zd)γ−1 < R(a∗)−Iγ(zb)γ−1 = 0. Then by ﬁrst order necessary condition of
the entry deterrence problem, this would imply that
θρ
1−e−ρ(T−ab) > zd·(1−σ)e−φad >
θρ
1−e−ρ(T−ad)
hence ad < ab, a contradiction. So zb > zd.
Now suppose that ad < as. From the ﬁrst order necessary condition of the entry deterrence
problem, I have e−ρa[(1−σ)e−φa(1−e−ρ(T−1))/ρ−θ] = −(R(a)−Iγ(z)γ−1). LHS is a decreasing
function of a. Since this function evaluated at ab is zero by equation (4), I know that this
function evaluated at ad is greater than zero. Hence R(ad)−Iγ(zd)γ−1 < 0. Then by Assumption
2 and the fact that zd · (1 − σ)e−φad < zb · (1 − σ)e−φab, I have zd > zb, a contradiction. So
ad > ab.
Since zd < zb and ld > lb, it’s clear that z/l is smaller in entry deterrence setting.
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